Traded securities have been mainly used to study the two-way causality between returns and liquidity in the finance literature. We argue that this Our empirical results show that, on one hand, illiquidity is attached to a higher expected return as investors are willing to pay a price for liquid assets and, on the other hand, higher returns attract more investors driving liquidity up. Particularly, we find that overall transaction volumes contain little information unless we separate between inflows and outflows.
Introduction
An investor wanting a portfolio exposure to real estate could achieve it through three main vehicles: direct investment, listed securities (i.e. REITs, CMBS, RMBS), or unlisted securities (i.e. total return swaps, or real estate funds). Direct investment requires a large amount of money and usually a wide knowledge of the market in all its segments. The listed securities market is an alternative which however offers a return/risk profile which is not much in line with the one of private real estate investment (i.e. it is more linked to either the equity -for REITs -or bond market -for MBS products. On the contrary, unlisted securities -and in particular real estate mutual funds (i.e. REMFs) -offer performance which are in line with the underlying market (i.e. the correlation coefficient between an investment in the direct market and in the unlisted funds index is bigger than 0.70).
REMFs are not exchanged in the stock market and can be set as a private partnership or a public collection of money. The main vehicles for the unlisted market are represented by limited partnerships (LP), Property unit trust (PUT) and managed funds. Our research focuses on the UK market, where the unlisted sector has been developed substantially, also thanks to the strict legislation that, until 2007, limited the proliferation of REIT structures in this market 3 .
If we look at the wider European unlisted market, we see that it includes 486 funds for a gross asset value (GAV) of 296.2 billion €. These funds are developed in different countries with a prevalence of UK that account more than 50% of the market with 189 funds and a GAV of 100.9 billion €, followed by Germany with 79 funds and a GAV of 87.7 billion €.
According The recent economic and financial crisis has revealed that liquidity plays a primary role in driving risk and return of real estate mutual funds. Although it is a common belief that liquidity influences the performance of a fund, as well as high performance attracts investment flowscreating a sort of loop with exponential consequences on both performance and flows -the winning causality between the two is not clear and needs further investigation because this double process tends to happen simultaneously. Since this debate has been explored in other contexts before, we can build upon previous literature to identify an appropriate method to test the reciprocal causality.
The aim of this project then is to analyse liquidity and other risk factors driving the pricing of real estate mutual funds, using a dataset of UK vehicles provided by IPD. The sample is composed by 71 funds and the sample period goes from 2005 to 2009. All funds invest in nonresidential buildings located in the UK.
To study this issue we propose a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) using a panel data.
Returns and flows are analyzed with a 4-lag structure which allows to test for one way causality going a year back in time -this is a standard procedure in previous works, as for example in Ling et al (2009) . Particularly, we decide to look at flows with three different specifications:
• number of units;
• Net Asset Value (i.e. NAV);
• Percentage of the total number of unit in the fund (which is the same as percentage of total amount of NAV in the fund).
The first two specifications of flows look at liquidity in absolute values, while the latter tries to look at liquidity relatively to the outstanding units available in the market (this may be important as some small funds may show a small transaction volume if compared to bigger funds, but the impact on their performance may be larger if the transaction refers to a high percentage of the outstanding units available in the fund. Secondly, we compute flows in three different ways:
• net flows (as the difference between inflows and outflows) will signal the direction of transactions (more on either the buying or selling side);
4 Source: INREV 2009 • inflows vs. outflows (tested separately) as buying vs. selling transactions may show a different impact / be influenced by returns differently;
• Transaction volumes as the overall transaction activity (and not only its direction as in the first formulation) may have an embedded signal.
Along with the two endogenous variables of total return and flows, in our VAR estimation, we also use other exogenous variables that we consider being important in explaining these two funds characteristics. These variables also function as control variables and have been chosen building on previous literature and considering the dataset available to the authors. Some examples are: fund dimension, leverage, cash, turnover, asset concentration, vintage, equity market returns, GDP growth, and outstanding redemptions. Finally we also add fund type and managerial variables to our model to test their relevance in explaining performance and transaction activity (e.g. specialized funds, INREV fund classification, bank group, other funds within the same group).
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we will present a review of the main body of literature published so far on the issue of liquidity and asset pricing, not only for REMFs, but also for other instruments. In the following section we will introduce the database used in our empirical testing, the different type of risks we consider. In the final two sections we will present our main finding and draw some conclusions, suggesting further research. Chordia (1996) suggests that real estate mutual funds provide three main benefits to investors.
Literature review
Firstly, they offer diversification. Individual investors (and sometimes mutual funds themselves)
cannot reach a desirable diversification in the real estate market because they do not possess enough resources; either those being enough money to be allow the purchase of several buildings, or expertise and knowledge in different market segments. According to IPD, the average price for a commercial property in the UK is £ 15 million. A good portfolio diversification could be achieved with 30 properties (Callender et al (2008) per segment (or sector or area). The amount of money to be raised would then necessarily be around £ 300 million, with clear difficulties for smaller investor (and private ones particularly if they wish to have a well-diversified multi-asset portfolio). Even if we think at shared ownership (let say 50% of the value of the property), for an investor wishing to reach a reasonable diversification, this amount would still be too high (more than £ 100 million).
Secondly, mutual funds have lower transaction costs because buying and selling their units allow investors to save the high transaction costs registered for direct real estate investments -i.e. fees to real estate agents/brokers and transfer tax as applied when the transaction takes place (e.g.
stamp duty in the UK market)
5
. This reduction of transaction costs and global cost has been first introduced by Gurley and Shaw (1960) and then re-analyzed by plenty of authors as Allen and Santomero (1996) or Brennan and Huges (1991) , who demonstrate that brokerage commission decline with the dimension of transaction.
Thirdly, mutual funds enable investor to share liquidity risk. When investing individually investors bear the entire risk. In fact in addition to the investment risk embedded in the instrument, an investor can be forced to redeem due to personal liquidity needs. Let us analyze how mutual funds solve this problem throughout an example. Let's say that the price of a unit in a fund is £10. If the investor does not redeem at the end of his investment period, he/she will receive £11 back. If he/she redeems in any moment before the end of the investment, he/she will receive only £9.50 because of expenses and the fact the investment has not reached its maturity yet. Let us assume that the probability of redemption is 0.5. The expected investment wealth will then be 0.25 with a variance of 0.75 2 .
[ENTER EXHIBIT 1 HERE]
If there are two investors, both with probability of redemption of 0.5, the scenario changes completely:
The expected return is exactly the same of investing individually but the risk has been reduced by 50%. The shared risk increases with the number of investors in a fund. This demonstrates that investing in Real Estate mutual fund reduces the risk, without affecting the return of the investment. Allen and Carletti (2007) argue that in periods when liquidity plays an important role -as in the actual credit crunch -the price of assets reflects more the level of liquidity of the instrument 5 However it is also worth mentioning that transaction costs will be actually paid by the fund when it buys and sells assets. Consequently the performance achieved by an investor in REMFs is already net of these costs (and they should also pay fees to enter/exit the fund on top of these ones.
than its expected future earnings. Therefore the liquidity of an instrument not only drives the performance but can also lead to distortions and contagion because funds are constrained to liquidate unnecessarily and, normally, most profitable assets.
The problem of liquidity is serious not only for the real estate market, but for mutual fund in general, as highlighted by Frazzini and Lamont (2008) , Greene et al. (2007) , Keswani and Stolin (2008) , and Ivkovic and Weisenbenner (2009) among many. In particular Edelen (1998) shows that the performance of a fund is strictly connected to the flow in the fund: an increase or a decrease of flow of money in a fund moves the fund from the optimal portfolio and therefore force the manager to relocate assets. This operation is more difficult for REMFs, because of the illiquid assets in their portfolios. In fact, as suggested by Saint-Pierre (1990) the problem of liquidity for REMF has two layers: liquidity of the asset and liquidity of the fund.
The relationship between liquidity and fund performance is also inversely correlated and rolling. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2008) show that players tend to redeem funds that had badly past performances and to invest in funds with positive past performance. Furthermore, Bergstresser and Poterba (2001) show that after-tax returns influence net fund flows, unrealized capital gain influences both in-and outflow (with greater effect on inflow) and past performance and past tax burden affect inflow.
In non listed open ended property fund the subscriber has the right to redeem its units at Although investors can exercise their redemption in any market condition, the manager cannot be able to generate sufficient liquidity to fulfil this request. Fund managers face this request in different way: reallocating shares to other investors in the fund (50% of the funds); first come first serve basis by setting a certain amount of redemption available (46%); in proportion of total request on the fund total assets (42%); raising short term debt-capital (40%); issuing new shares (29%). Funds can also incorporate a deferral or closure provision for these situations in order to raise liquidity for redemption (selling an asset (83%), increase leverage (12%), etc.). In the current period of crisis some funds have just shut the door to redeemer winding down the fund. In fact a fund easily incur in loss when it needs to liquidate an asset, in a market in which price and demand has drastically fallen. (younger fund managers are likely to achieve higher performances). With a slightly different idea Brounen et al (2007) explain that an increase of performance in equity markets leads to an increase in redemption within the real estate market that is simply considered as cash market with higher performance. We have decided to study only open ended funds (as the closed ended funds section is extremely smaller in that database and the pricing issue in the two types of funds differ) and to exclude funds with less than 5 observations because of the lag structure of 4 quarters we have decided to adopt in our VAR approach (e.g. some funds created in Q3 of 2008 were deleted from our database because 2 observations are not enough to run an autoregressive process of order 4).
Data description
Therefore the 'cleaned' database is composed by 49 funds for a total amount of 686 quarterly observations. The NAV of the dataset is £ 28bn for a total value (GAV) of the database of £ 30bn. There are some differences between the first and last quarters of the sample: the total value of funds is diminished by 30% but it is diminished more in NAV, than cash (not changed) and leverage (which grows also thanks to the decrease in property values). The percentage growth in leverage, partially driven by the decrease in NAV represents already a strong signal of problems faced by the real estate unlisted market in recent periods.
Our dataset also includes different cross-sectional characteristics of market indexes such as FTSE 100 (equity market), IPD Property Pooled Fund Index (unlisted market), 90 day Treasury bill yield (risk free rate) and UK Gross Domestic Product (state of the economy). Figure 3 reports the main descriptive statistics of variables.
[INSERT EXHIBIT 4 HERE]
The total return has values between -45% and 20% with an average return being slightly negative. This is because after the third quarter 2008 the market incurred in severe losses and during the previous period was experiencing a steep expansion. This path is well represented by both standard deviation and Sharpe ratio: the first has a maximum value of 18% and the latter had a negative average figure. Funds in the dataset have a significant dimension with an average value of £ 666m and a leverage of £ 80m (12%). Obviously the average value of this variable has little meaning because we can find very big funds (more than £ 5bn) and several pension funds being core and not using leverage at all. The asset turnover for funds in the sample is quite high and on average is around 10%. This means that funds are actively managed, even if it is difficult to understand whether some of them are simply tracking a specific index. Some funds are both/either sector-specific and/or regionally concentrated as the Herfindahl index shows. Flows have an average value of zero because in the first part of the sample funds experienced very few outflows and a constant inflow of money, while they recorded an outflow of money in the latter period. Outstanding outflows arrive at 74% of the total number of units in the fund. Figure 6 represents, for the whole sample period, the maximum (blue) and minimum (red) crosssectional total return in each quarter, the average performance of the market (3 months PPFI that corresponds to the average total return of our sample), the standard deviation of the sample and the performance of the stock market (FTSE 100). For graph readability we kept the scale from -40% to +20% and so we do not see the minimum total return of -89% in Q1 2009.
[INSERT EXHIBIT 5 HERE]
We can notice that the total return of real estate mutual funds was stable and consistent over the 
Main variables
We build on Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) and divide our variables in endogenous (or directly controlled by the manager) and exogenous (not controlled by the fund manager in any manner).
We also add a third category of variables -similar to the board structure variables in Ghosh and
Sirmans (2005) -which is not completely either endogenous or exogenous and we call it investor variables set. We do not use any variables on tax transparency because the domicile of UK funds (i.e. Jersey, Ireland, etc.) reduces the exposure of funds to taxation.
Endogenous variables are proxy of the risk connected with the management of a fund: decisions of the management on investments, expenses or debt influence the performance of a fund and the risk a fund is taking. These variables depend on decisions made directly by the manager or by other players in the mutual fund. Among these variables we classify: fund size, debt, sector specialisation, assets turnover, fund investment and Vintage.
Exogenous variables represent a proxy for the risk connected with the economic timeenvironment in which a fund was issued: they are totally independent from individual decision but they impact on a fund performance and risk. Brounen, Veld and Raitio (2007) demonstrate that REMFs are seen as a cash alternative that provides a slightly higher return by some investors. In time of poor equity returns, REMFs experience a high inflow of capital. Other investors, in accordance with Gullet and Redman (2005) , use these funds to reduce the risk of a wider portfolio, or as a low risk exposure to the real estate market. Among these variables, we classify stock market returns and growth in gross domestic product.
Investor variables 8 depend entirely neither on the manager's decision nor on the economic environment, but they are positioned in between. For example, in this category we find the flow of money, which is driven partly by the manager's ability (well managed fund attract more capital) and partly by the economic and financial situation of the market, but also by personal investors' needs (i.e. investors have liquidity functions that are independent on the performance of the fund). Among these variables we classify: inflows and outflows, property tenants, lease length and outstanding redemptions.
In the final part of this section we describe all the variables we use and state our assumptions about their impact on total returns and fund flows.
Leverage. The leverage is the amount of debt a fund is sustaining in percentage on the equity of that fund. We consider as equity the asset of the fund. Debt is a proxy for the level of risk: a high level of leverage indicates an increase of the risk in the fund due to the additional interest to be paid on the debt, but it also amplifies the performance of the fund due to dimension. The desired level of leverage for investor is 50% of the value of the properties although 20% is considered pointless and level over 75% too much risky. On the other hand managers claim that most of the performance of Real Estate mutual funds comes from gearing (Baum 2001) . The leverage has an impact on both in-and outflow of investor from the funds, because its function of multiplier of the risk. Leverage has also a different effect on both new money and old money flow. Finally, leverage is rarely used to cover the equity loss given by redemptions in a fund: only
8% of the Real estate mutual funds use this opportunity (INREV 2009).
Performance. I consider the performance experienced by the Real estate mutual fund in the previous period. Previous studies such as Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) been demonstrated that big buildings, which usually belong to larger mutual funds, have been best-performing in 90s and early 00s (Baum 2001) . The size of a fund could also lead to a better diversification, but it is not been proven by the literature that this effect is significant and consistent. This is because commonly we consider every fund well diversified, independently from the size.
Vintage. The vintage is the time measured in quarter from the creation of a fund and the quarter in which the fund is analyzed. Tomperi (2009) demonstrates that fund with higher sequence have a negative correlation with the performance of the fund supporting the idea that younger fund managers perform better than well established fund manager. Furthermore the age of the fund allow us to understand the time in which the core part of the assets were bought and it is a sort of proxy of the experience of the fund. Moreover O'neal and Page (2000) say that if it exist efficiencies that can be gained from management experience therefore the age of the fund must be directly correlated with the performance of the fund. Anyway they find a significant negative impact of the age on the abnormal return of the fund, supporting the idea that do not exist efficiencies connected to the management experience, which means there is no experience effect in REMF.
Cash. The cash is the amount of assets detained as money or similar as a percentage of the total asset of the fund. Ling and Naranjo (2002) we use the turnover with a lag of one quarter. The single value of the turnover does not tell us whether the movement in a fund has been driven by a liquidity need or for a planned strategy.
Notwithstanding the joint use of this variables with flows variables allow to track also this effect.
Equity. The equity market index represents the performance of the stock market. Because the majority of the funds included in the database are from the UK market I have included the London stock exchange index (FTSE 100) as equity market index. Brounen, Veld and Raitio (2007) demonstrated that Real estate mutual funds are sensitive to movements and to sentiment in the general equity market. In fact these vehicles are seen by investors as a cash alternative that provide a slightly higher return. In time of poor equity returns, Real estate mutual funds experience a high inflow of capital. Conversely, when the equity market is upturning they experience a massive outflow of capital. Therefore the performance of the equity market drives the redemption risk in Real Estate mutual funds and affects their risk-adjusted performance.
GDP. The gross domestic product indicates the production of a country in a given period. Ilka Outstanding redemptions. The redemption outstanding is the number of redemptions that have not been liquidated in the previous quarter and that will be liquidated in the actual quarter.
In addition with net flow, it shows not only the flow of money in the fund, but also the expected flow of the next quarter. Outstanding redemptions are a data that is invisible to investor, but affect heavily the performance of the fund and the plan of the manager.
Specialisation. I want to study whether the fact that a fund is specialized or not matter on the risk-adjusted performance of a Real Estate mutual fund. Baum (2001) affirms that specialisation and focus are the two most important attributes for unlisted vehicles: they allowed exposure to property and property style which are difficult to access otherwise and they are a way to hand off difficult properties sector. They exist two different types of specialisation: specialisation by sector and specialisation by geographical distribution. Mutual funds in the database invest mainly in the UK so the geographic specialization will be considered between the different area of UK (South The empirical section is structured as follows: firstly, we analyze the relationship between total returns and transactions volume; secondly, we split between inflows and outflows; thirdly, we subtract outflows from inflows to obtain net flows (i.e. proxy for direction of flows). At the end of the section we finally introduce variables for fund type and fund manager's characteristics.
Empirical results
Previous studies using data on mutual funds documented that there is a strong correlation between performances and flows in a fund. More specifically we intend to explore the effect of three different specifications of flows on total return. First of all we decide to study the relationship between total returns and the absolute sum of flows in a fund that we call transactions volume. We expect a positive inter-temporal correlation between the two.
[
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A fund performance is influenced by an autoregressive parameter of order 4 (excluding the 2 lags component In addition our estimation shows that returns are highly correlated with both leverage and cash.
These two coefficients present a sign that is opposite to the one we may expect: on one hand leverage increases the performance of a mutual fund because it is a source for new investment (INREV 2009 ) and on the other hand cash should decrease returns because it represents money not invested in real estate and therefore not bringing additional return. These results are explained firstly by the fact that our sample period experiences substantially negative returns (with an average of -3%) given by market condition following the real estate turmoil in 2007. In fact funds with higher leverage have experienced higher losses because it was not possible for them to repay back their gearing. Moreover, funds with higher cash, managed to hedge losses with injection of capital in moments in which it was difficult to raise money in other way, i.e.
either equity or loan, and kept a higher profile for investor and banks, when money returns to flow into the real estate market.
Furthermore the coefficient of the two macro economical variable, GDP and Equity, is significant. The positive effect of the equity market on REMF returns shows that these two markets are positively related and do not work as substitute (i.e. when there is money available in the economy, both markets benefit from it). In the recent crisis we have experienced that a high loss of performance in the real estate market was simultaneous to a similar loss in equity markets.
Instead, as Tomperi (2009) We then decide to split transaction volumes into two components representing flows of money going into (inflows) and out of (outflows) a fund. This split allows us to understand whether there is a specific link between returns and one or the other, as well as to study the money smart [
INSERT EXHIBIT 8 HERE]
From Exhibit 8 we can be infer that total returns are not driven by any lag of either inflows and outflows, with the exception of half-yearly lagged inflows. Moreover, the sign and magnitude of coefficients of other variables are similar to previous results. The R-squared is also not substantially different from the one before and our model explains 68% of the variance of performances.
As far as inflows are concerned, instead, we notice that they are influenced by total returnseven if the effect is not persistent in all three estimations -lagged outflows and they show an autoregressive component. Moreover inflows have a negative relationship with turnover showing that active managed funds do not attract new flows of money. This effect is explained by the fact that during our sample period many funds were forced to sell the best assets in order to achieve their need of liquidity, whilst investors in fund do not appreciate this forced turnover because it causes a loss of fund performance. This money smart effect is not sustained by the effect of the coefficient of leverage. In fact leverage has a positive effect, i.e. investors perceive funds with higher leverage as more attractive because of their higher potential gains. The same could be said for outflows that have a strong negative correlation with leverage, showing that this idea concerning high leveraged funds makes the investor feel trustful in future performances, and therefore they do not exit from the fund.
The positive effect of cash, instead, is caught by both inflows and outflows. Although this effect was expected for inflows -because funds with higher cash reserve have more flexibility in periods of market turbulence -the same effect was not expected for outflows: old money investors perceive a cash buffer as a loss for the fund, because it does not produce additional performance. Furthermore vintage is positively correlated with inflows, meaning that investors value a fund's experience (i.e. funds originated before in time have additional experience compared to younger funds, and therefore they can achieve additional performances). As previously, we use a Wald test for the joint significance of the lagged variables (we decided to omit the joint effect of two variables on the third one because it is always not significant).
Similarly to transaction volumes, total return and both inflows and outflows have a strong autoregressive parameter and there is no illiquidity premium in a fund performance even if we split between incoming and outgoing flows. However differently from the case with transaction volumes, we find that return chasing behaviour occurs for inflows (but not for outflows) which are significantly determined by REMF returns. This result means that a higher performance attracts more capital inside a fund, while investors do not tend to leave the fund -expecting for a future recovery -when the fund is performing badly. Furthermore, inflows are also driven by outflows positively and this shows the fact that there is a tendency to match the request for redemptions and new entries in a fund. This procedure avoids the change in equity or cash, and therefore hedges the fund against the need of selling or buying new assets in not favourable market conditions. In other words, the performance of a fund is not driven by either inflows or outflows because investors prefer to hold long positions in mutual funds. Instead better performing funds attract new capital and the preferable option used by managers and investors is to trade units instead of redeeming them 9 .
In our final step of fund flows analysis, we intend to study the direction of flows, using a new variable (netflows) which is computed as inflow minus outflows. This last part of our analysis allows us to understand whether the direction of capital flows contains information and towards which direction (i.e. either flows determining performance or performance attracting flows).
INSERT EXHIBIT 9 HERE]
Our results in Exhibit 9 suggest that returns have a strong autoregressive component and this result is consistent with the previous two sets of findings. In addition, returns are negatively correlated with netflows within the previous year. This result is consistent for all the three models even if is weakening when the direction is considered using NAV and not number of units in a fund.
Although the effect of variables on performances is similar to the previous models, we can see a substantial difference for fund size. In fact, size is not significant in the first two formulations of our models, but it becomes significant when we consider flows as a turnover ratio (i.e.
percentage of the total NAV / number of units available in a fund). inflows dominate) and a negatively concave function defined between zero and minus infinite (or better minus the maxim amount of NAV or units which is possible to trade in any fund) for negative netflows (i.e. outflows dominate). The smaller the fund is, the steeper the function would be: the flat part of the function is shorter and the maxim of NAV/units which can be sold is nearer zero. This shows that the same movement in volumes between two differently sized funds may lead to a different effect on the return/price because the relative value of volumes would be bigger for a smaller fund. This result is supported by the effect the variable size has in our model: it is not significant in the first two models while it becomes significant in the third one (with flows in percentage). Moreover net flows are not driven by performances although in our third model they are just significant at a 90% confidence level. In conclusion there is no pricing and there is return chasing. To exchange 50% of a fund (vs. 10%) does not matter because a 50% trade on a 2 million fund doesn't convey the same information as a 50% trade on a 2 billion fund.
Fund Types and Managerial Characteristics
To conclude we introduce other two classes of variables. Fund types are represented by dummy variables identifying the nature of a fund and not changing over time. Among these variables, we have the INREV fund style classification (i.e. core, value added and opportunistic funds), and specialized fund 10 (looking at the diversification level). In the model we only use two of three dummy variables for fund style and we keep core funds as the base case scenario. Moreover, since INREV uses leverage as one of the variables used to define the three types of fund, we then omit leverage from our model not to double count it (i.e. possible multicollinearity). For managerial characteristics, we have identified variables allowing us to understand whether the influence of the asset manager matters or not: bank group, other fund and company value. 'Bank group' is a dummy being 1 if a fund is managed by a bank group or 0 otherwise. We expect that managers working within a big banking group are more experienced or at least have more accessibility to funding, more instruments to support their decision making and therefore should provide a higher performance. 'Other funds' represents a dummy variable being 1 if a fund is issued by a company that has already issued another fund or 0 otherwise. In this case we are testing the learning curve of the manager and therefore the know-how accumulated over time.
Finally, 'company value' is a different proxy of the size of a fund, and it is created as the sum of the value of funds belonging to the same company. Many mutual funds are managed by the same asset manager or by the same group of asset managers. Therefore we want to test if there are specific strategies among a company or if funds jointly managed in a big group are successful.
When this variable is used, the size of the fund is omitted from the model for clear issues of multicollinearity.
[ INSERT EXHIBIT 10 HERE] Exhibit 10 shows that the coefficient for specialized funds is significant and negative for both inand outflows but it is not for netflows. This result means that funds with high specialisation in a sector attract less money but at the same time are not actively exchanged because of the jointly effect of negative volume, negative outflows and not significant netflows which show insignificance. These results along with results concerning asset concentration in a mutual fund
show that investors in REMFs are sensitive to the diversification choice decided by funds.
Moreover opportunistic funds are highly significant in all models, but only for total returns. The negative effect of this variable, along with the negative (even if not significant) effect of the coefficient for value added funds, shows that, as the risk/return profile of funds increases, the relative performance diminishes (i.e. value added up to -1.4% opportunistic up to -4.2%). This result is consistent in the three models, and it results to be negative as the overall sample period had negative returns on average (i.e. higher risk means higher absolute return, being either positive or negative depending upon the cycle).
Finally, no managerial characteristic is significant in any of the three different models for each measure of fund flows (i.e. transaction volumes, inflows and outflows, netflows). This result may suggest that the learning curve or accessibility to funds within the same banking group do not seem to improve performances and or attract more funds.
Conclusions
The real estate unlisted market is a growing investment opportunity worldwide. Notwithstanding its high profitability, little research has been carried out on asset pricing to understand the nature of its performance. We have analyzed the risk factors of UK real estate mutual funds, with a particular focus on the relationship between performance and liquidity. Our sample period (i.e.
2005-2009) is mainly dominated by the recent economic crisis and shows an average negative return and an increased volatility.
Following the work of Gosh and Sirmans (2005), we identify endogenous, exogenous, investor's and managerial variables, connected with the risk and performance of mutual funds. We give three different definitions of flows using either NAV or number of units exchanged at each measurement point and we then classified liquidity in three ways: inflows and outflows, overall transaction volumes (i.e. the sum of the two) and netflows (i.e. the difference between the two).
Following a panel data VAR approach as in Ling¸ Marcato and Mc Allister (2009), we find that transaction volumes contain little information and are not enhanced by higher fund performances. However, if we distinguish between flows coming into or going out of a fund, we see that illiquidity is not priced, but inflows are affected by past performance (i.e. return chasing behaviour by investors) and money flowing out of funds (i.e. for mutual funds the most common form of redemptions is the trading of units between new comers and out goers. Finally we show that returns are influenced by directions of flows in a fund but only when we consider the absolute flow of money. In fact we demonstrate that the fund size is significant because changes in capital within a fund have a different impact on the price depending upon the dimension of the fund that is experiencing this differential variation.
Generally the Adjusted R-squared of our estimations is consistent and shows an average of 68% for the total return equation, 30% for net flows, 40% for both inflows and outflows, and 50%
for transaction volumes.
All other variables included in our model tend to have a similar sign and significance in all estimations (with changes in the flows equation because of a different measure of flows we use in our exercise). Particularly, we notice the importance of leverage which is strongly significant for total returns, net flows and outflows. The negative sign of the coefficient in the total return model is due to the sample period we used (i.e. funds with higher leverage tended to experience higher losses).
A similar result is given by cash (with a 1 quarter lag), which is significant for almost every dependent variable. The positive effect on the return -even if it would have been expected to be negative -reveals the possibility of a real option value in the cash figure if the fund managers were to invest in projects with positive NPV.
Another interesting result refers to the macroeconomic and financial variables (GDP and equity) which appear to be strongly significant for total returns but not for fund flows. We conclude that the market cycle drives fund performances, but do not cause changes in investment behaviour after accounting for all other factors.
Furthermore, focusing on the analysis with inflows and outflows, we notice that our results confirm the intuitions given in Frazzini and Lomont (2008) who find that in the UK market there is a money smart effect among individuals and institutional investors, but only on the buying side (i.e. the significant coefficient for the model using inflows confirms theoretical expectations, while the one on the outflows does not).
Finally, if we consider the results of fund types and managerial characteristics, we find that only opportunistic funds are strongly significant in all models. In particular the estimation shows that, while value added and core funds are not significantly different, opportunistic funds showed a higher performance in absolute returns (negative coefficient of -4.2% for a sample period with average negative returns), after paying for all the embedded risks.
The next step of this research stream would be in the direction of trying to see if these risk factors can be used to construct trading rules which are able to generate over-performance consistently over time. A montecarlo simulation of randomly generated portfolios among the ones ranked first according to the characteristics previously identified could be benchmarked against a naïve investment strategy where an equal proportion of the portfolio is used to invest in each fund available in the market. If results are significant, then, investors may use these trading rules to achieve a higher performance. Exhibit 3: Characteristics of the main dataset used in this study.
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